Tonini v. State Bar of California [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
5-15-1956
Tonini v. State Bar of California [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Tonini v. State Bar of California [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 154.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/154
TONINI SN.TE BAR 491 
[46 C.2d 491; 
defendant's 
the new trial is affirmed. The appeal 
F. No. 19421. In Bank. 
ARD MIIIrON TO~INI et aL, STATE 
BAR OF CAI;IFOI{NIA, Respondent. 
Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-In a discipli-
proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact by local 
administrative committees and the Board of Bar Governors 
not binding on the Supreme Court, which will weigh and 
on the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the findings of 
such board. 
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Burden of Proof.-
The burden is on a petitioner seeking review of the Board of 
Governors' recommendation to show that the findings are 
supported by the evidence or that the board's recommenda-
erroneous or unlawful. 
Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence.--Findings of 
Board of Bar Governors that two attorneys solicited legal 
business from a number of persons, most of whom had suffered 
in automobile accidents, in violation of Rules of 
Professional Conduct, rule 2, § a, were sustained by evidence 
among other things, that none of the persons involved 
the accidents was known had an acquaintance with, or 
a former client of either attorney, that visits made at a 
and solicitations of legal employment were without 
request or communication from the claimants or anyone 
authorized to act on their behalf. 
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Punishment.-Suspension of 
attorneys from the practice of law for three years for 
"ambulance was not excessive punishment where the 
record discloses a callous and brazen indifference to the obli-
of an with the of personal 
See Cal.Jur.2d, 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Attorneys, § 174; Attorneys, 
§ § 172(9). 
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PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension 
o:f attorneys for three years. Petitioners suspended for three 
years. 
George G. Olshausen for Petitioners. 
Garrett H. Elmore for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-This is a proceeding to review a recom-
mendation of the Board of Governors of The State Bar that 
petitioners be suspended from the practice of law for a period 
of three years. 
Two show cause orders directed to petitioners were con-
solidated for hearing. They charged petitioners with hav-
ing solicited legal business from some 10 persons, most of 
whom had suffered injuries in accidents, in violation of rule 
2, section a, Rules of Professional Conduct ( 33 Cal.2d 27) .1 
The Board of Governors found the charges sustained and 
recommended that petitioners be suspended for one year on 
each count of the orders to show cause. In addition, the 
board recommended that petitioner Tonini's suspension on 
counts involving ·walter F. Horn, Anthony J. Vargas, and 
the father of Ronald Reed, a minor, be made to run con-
secutively, the suspension on all other counts to run concur-
rently therewith. The same recommendation was made 
concerning petitioner MacDonald, except that the three counts 
recommended to run consecutively related to Eric Haak, 
Bessie Manson and Sylvan Lehman. 
PETITIONERS' CoNTENTIONS 
First : That the findings of the Board of Governor-s are 
not supported by the evidence. 
This claim is untenable. [1] The rule is settled that in a 
disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact 
by local administrative committees and the Board of Bar 
Governors are not binding on the Supreme Court, which will 
weigh and pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the findings of the Board of Bar Governors. 
[2] It is also settled that the burden is upon the petitioner 
seeking a review of the Board of Bar Governors' recommenda-
tion to show that the findings are not supported by the 
evidence or that the recommendation of the Board of Bar 
1Rule 2, section a, Rules of Professional Conduct reads: ''A member 
of the State Bar shall not solicit professional employment by advertise· 
ment or otherwise.'' 
L 
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for,:going rules to the rcconl in the 
it discloses that petitioner Tonini was 
law in 1D46, and that petitioner l\tlac-
adlllitted to praetice law in 19:YL Neither peti-
been the subject of any previous pro-
of Saturday, April10, Hli54, Sylvan IJehman 
with Clara 1\Iohr at Post and l;eavenworth 
PnwcisccL 'l'hey were struck by au automobile 
Post Street at about 8 p. m. Mr. Lehman sus-
fracturwl hip and was taken to the City and County 
thence to l\tlt. Zion Hospital about midnight. The 
morning Mr. I1ehman was called upon by petitioner 
at :M:t. Zion regarding his injuries, and he signed 
n c:enllraet employing Mr. MacDonald the following day. 
Mohr, 66 years of age, was injured in the same acci-
d,·nL snstaining a broken leg. 'l'hc same rourse as to hospitali-
zal was followed in her case as in that of JVIr. l~ehman. 
On Jl:,; following morning petitioner MacDonald called upon 
the hospital and talked to her about employment in 
'rhe following day she signed a contract with him 
he was employed to represent her. 
11 p. m. on May 26, 1954, Erik Haak was involved 
in a ~·ollision at the intersection of 'l'urk and 1<-,ranklin Streets, 
a fractured neck and lesser injuries. He was 
Emergency Hospital and then to Stanford Lane 
al. The first or second day after the accident petitioner 
}laeDunald called upon him at the hospital and solicited 
Sisk was struck by a Greyhound bus about 7 p. m. 
on ,Jmw 9, 1954. She died on the evening of the third day 
having been in a comatose condition in Franklin 
after the accident and during the short period of 
illiH'SS. A man identifying himself as "Attorney l\IacDonald 
or his representative" telephoned Thomas Sisk, father-in-law 
of J\Iat'ie Sisk, for the purpose of locating his daughter and 
also sistt>r of Marie Sisk in order that he might talk to 
tlwm regarding the "injuries" to Marie. On the morning 
of .Tune 13, petitioner MacDonald appeared at the family 
home in Southern California for the purpose of contacting and 
L. P. Sisk, the surviving husband of Marie Sisk. 
C.2d 
suffered minor in. 
She was taken to Central 
officers inves-
she was contacted 
himself as "Mr. Mac-
of Mr. Tonini." The caller stated 
to see her about the accident. An appointment 
for noon that at petitioners' offices. She 
the and the person who had pre-
viously telephoned called that afternoon wanting to 
know why she had not come clown to the office, and he offered 
to come to her house. 
On August 5, 1954, Walter Horn, a machinist, was seriously 
injured when struck by an automobile at 5th and Jessie 
Streets at 2 :10 in the morning. He was taken in a semi-
conscious condition to Central Emergency Hospital, where 
he was registered as '' vValter Harm.'' About 7 a. m. of that 
day he vvas transferred to the City and County Hospital. 
Petitioner 'l'onini saw the injured man at the City and County 
Hospital twice on August 5 (the day of the accident), once 
briefly in the late afternoon and then a couple of hours later 
in the evening, at which time a contract of employment was 
signed by Mr. Horn. At the time Mr. Horn was admitted 
to the hospital he had an alcoholic breath and was extremely 
shaky, so much so that the nurses placed side boards or side 
rails on his bed to prevent him from falling out of it. 
Early in the morning the following day, August 6, peti-
tioner Tonini returned to the hospital and certain events took 
place regarding the verification of a complaint in an action, 
"Walter Harm, Plaintiff, vs. Allen E. Hertel et al." Peti-
tioner Tonini signed the name "\V alter Harm" as the person 
verifying a complaint he had prepared and later filed. 
At this time Mr. Horn was able to sign his own name, as is 
indicated by the fact that on the same date he had signed 
a ''Request for Admission and Agreement to Reimburse.'' 
To the verification is affixed petitioner Tonini's signature as 
a notary public. Petitioner Tonini signed the verification 
with the intention of concealing Mr. Horn's mental condition 
at the time from defendants in the action which he was filing. 
This was done so that the inference would not be drawn that 
Mr. Horn was not then alert and lucid. 
An examination of the complaint indicates on its face that 
petitioner endeavored to make it appear that Walter II arm 
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son of William R. Reed 
tt<::lau•~u~ in Francisco. About 
m. Mr. Reed, his and neighbors went to the City 
Hospital. The Reeds returned to San Jose in 
morning hours of August 31. In the afternoon 
Mr. Reed called at the office of a San Jose 
who had previously represented him. Shortly after 
of the same day petitioner Tonini, identifying him-
as Attorney Badliaco of San Francisco, telephoned Mr. 
He solicited the case and asked Mr. Reed to come 
up to San Francisco. Mr. Reed refused, and suggested 
10 a. m. the next day, at which time he went to petitioners' 
There petitioner Tonini revealed his true identity. 
n~-~.~ ... :~~ Tonini told Mr. Reed to make arrangements to go 
attorney in San Jose (Mr. Manina), described as "his 
n<>1"f'YIA'?' H 
On September 23, 1954, about 8 p. m., Mr. Clarence Urdahl, 
was struck by an automobile. He was first taken to 
Emergency Hospital, then removed to the Southern 
Hospital. He sustained serious injuries. Peter Gray 
family name was Garadis), an experienced claims 
111;n'\si~i,.ll and adjuster and licensed as an insurance and 
real estate broker, was a long-time acquaintance of petitioner 
Tonini. About 7 a. m. the following morning petitioner Tonini 
Le1eiJJcwrieu Mr. Gray and asked him to call on Mr. Urdahl, 
petitioner described as ''a client of his who was in the 
whom he was supposed to go see on that morning 
and that he was unable to get there himself, but could later 
in that day.'' Petitioner Tonini supplied Mr. Gray with 
name of the hospital and room number. 
Mr. Gray went to see Mr. Urdahl, discussed the accident 
and fees on behalf of petitioner Tonini and obtained Mr. 
446 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads in part as follows: 
the pleading is verified by the attorney, or any other person 
one of the parties, he shall set forth in the affidavit the reasons 
is not made by one of the parties. '' 
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Urdahl's signature to a fee contract which he had pre-
pared in his own handwriting. 
Mr. MacDonald stated that at approximately 9 a. m. the 
same morning, petitioner Tonini phoned from his office to 
his home saying, "I have got a new client in the SP Hospital. 
Pete Garadis has seen this man, and he, the man, has signed 
a 25 per cent contract. Go out.'' Petitioner MacDonald 
went to the hospital about 10 or 11 a. m., as an associate of 
petitioner Tonini, and had a conference with Mr. Urdahl. 
At noon on the same day Mr. Gray saw petitioner Mac-
Donald at his law office when he brought the paper signed 
by Mr. Urdahl. He told petitioner MacDonald that it was 
"the memorandum Mr. Urdahl signed"; that "Mr. Tonini 
had called him [Gray] and asked him to go see the man.'' The 
same afternoon petitioner MacDonald again called on Mr. 
Urdahl at the hospital. 
On October 28, 1954, Anthony Vargas was injured while 
driving a mail truck which collided with another vehicle. 
He was taken to Central Emergency Hospital, where he 
remained about one half hour. He then reported back to 
the Post Office garage and went home. The evening of the 
next day Mr. Vargas found a card under his doorstep, that 
of petitioner Tonini, on the reverse of which was written, 
"Anthony Vargas, call me at home, GLenwood 3-7336, call 
collect, Tonini." The following day Mr. Vargas called the 
telephone number and talked with petitioner Tonini. The 
latter said he had placed the card under the doorstep; "that 
he would like to be engaged as my attorney'' and to get in 
touch with him at his office. Mr. Vargas later met Mr. 
MacDonald in his law office and discussed the case. 
The record further discloses that none of the persons 
involved in the accidents was known to, or had an acquaint-
ance with, or was a former client of either petitioner, and 
that the visits and solicitations were without prior request or 
communication from the claimants or anyone authorized to 
act on their behalf. 
Petitioner Tonini on several other occasions caused his 
clients to engage in fictitious transactions, and he failed on 
occasions to make a proper accounting to his clients. 
On the night before a committee hearing of The State Bar, 
petitioners went to the home of Mrs. Manson, and petitioner 
Tonini told her she should hear what he had to say before 
she appeared to testify and that it would mean something to 
1'ecommendcd the 
Bar Governo1·s was excessive. 
contention is devoid of merit. 
violated was designed to prohibit 
obtaining contracts of employment. 
present proceeding the record discloses a callous and 
brazen indifference to the obligations of an with 
the of personal gain. Under these circumstances 
tiom:rs should be removed from the practice of law for a 
period of time in order that they may realize 
of their ways and rehabilitate thrmsdves brfore 
resuming a place in the ranks of the 
Water·man v. State Bar, 14 CaL2d 224 
with a prior record, admitting three 
lance and who gave false testimony to the 
wa'\ disbarred. 
v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 71 P.2d 206], an attar-
persisted in advertising for divorce business 
suspension for such conduct, was disbarrPd. 
ordered that petitioners be from the prac-
the law in this stat<' for the period of tlJrPe 
30 days after the date of the o[ this order. 
agree with the majority that the rccorcl discloses 
conduct of a somewhat serious nature on the 
both petitioners, l am of the ihat the disci-
ordered js too severe. Taking into cmJ::;id<'ration the 
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age and prof,~SS!Ollal OV>~C>PH>n 
nature of the unprofessional conduct on their 
by the it is my that a 
for the period of one year would be more in 
discipline imposed for similar conduct in other cases 
have come before this court. 
It should be obvious that a 
of law is almost 
not believe that such severe 
on young, 
disclosed the record here. 
C.2d 
For the foregoing reasons I would suspend petitioners from 
the practice of law for the period of one year. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied June 6, 
1956, and the time for commencement of their suspension was 
extended to commence August 15, 1956. Carter, J., was of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 23976. In Bank. May 18, 1956.] 
CESAR LAMBRETON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCI-
DENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Negligence- Serious and Wilful Misconduct.- Serious and 
wilful misconduct means something different from and much 
more than negligence, however gross; such misconduct is 
basically the antithesis of negligence, and the two types of 
behavior are mutually exclusive. 
[2a, 2b] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-Effect 
of Amendment.-A workmen's compensation claim expressly 
stating that "the employer was grossly negligent" cannot serve 
as the basis for a later "amendment" setting forth a charge 
of serious and wilful misconduct which would impose an en-
tirely new and different legal liability on the employer where, 
at no time within 12 months from the date of injury, was it 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 8; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 48. 
[2] See Oal.Jur., Workmen's § 160; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 489. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 8; [2] Workmen's 
Compensation, § 146; [3-5] Workmen's Compensation, § 123. 
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